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Historical Context and Philosophy of Science:  
Reply to Peter Simons' "Coincidence and Kite Flying" (revised 4 March 2009) 
 
    In his review of my book1, Wittgenstein Flies A Kite:  A Story of Models of Wings and 
Models of the World, Peter Simons implies that I take a coincidence as my starting point 
and, from it, attempt to infer a connection (between the methodology of scale models 
and the view of propositions in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.)  Actually, Wittgenstein spoke of 
a connection between scale models and propositions.  What I do is provide the historical 
context to explain what the term "scale model" meant to someone situated as he was 
when he made the connection, and, more importantly, explain the development of the 
accompanying notion of physical similarity in that historical context.   Simons tries to 
argue against historical context being very important, but his argument relies upon 
mistaken ideas about how isolated Wittgenstein was throughout 1914.  I feel it is 
unfortunate that Simons puts so much importance on being able to identify a specific 
causal path of influence from the contemporaneous landmark paper on the methodology 
of scale models with which I see a thematic connection, and misstates or neglects so 
much of the book that should be of interest to philosophers of science.   
      The important notion in the historical context is that of physically similar systems.  It 
is a generalization of the notion of geometrically similar figures. That is, it is a 
generalization of the notion of similarity found in the discipline of geometry to various 
notions of similarity in physics (kinematic similarity, dynamic similarity, hydrodynamic 
similarity, electrical similarity, usw.).   The notion was quite consciously revived from the 
Renaissance (specifically from some lesser-known writings of Newton and Galileo) in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Around 1911 - 1914, the topic of similarity 
took on heightened prominence in a variety of scientific fields.  Thus I spoke of the 
"variety of publications on similarity"  around 1914 (p. x) that shaped the surrounding 
landscape of ideas, and wrote in the preface (p. vii):  "This book traces threads in the 
background of the first private moment" of an insight that Wittgenstein reported having.         
     In this reply, I'd like to correct the misconception Simons' review gives (that my book 
"is about a coincidence" of two isolated moments widely separated in space).  I also 
want to identify and correct the errors of historical fact he makes and relies upon to 
                                            
1  Simons, Peter . "Coincidence and Kite Flying"  Metascience, March 2009.  
argue against the significance of the historical context.  Finally, I point out a few things in 
my book that he omits to mention that tell against some of the other things he says in his 
review of my book.   
     Let's get the historical facts straight first.  Simons' review is not correct about where 
Wittgenstein was when.  My approach appealed more to what was available in the 
scientific milieu than to any specific interaction (p. 205), but since Simons relies on 
where he (mistakenly) thinks Wittgenstein was at various times in 1914 in order to 
discredit my suggestion that Wittgenstein could have been cognizant of discussions in 
Vienna about what was going on in science at the time, these errors of factual detail 
matter to defending my more general claims.   Simons states: "Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
thinking hard in his Norwegian fastness about how propositions represent the world and 
how logic works, recalled reading about the use of a small model of streets and cars 
used in a Paris court to represent a traffic accident, and hit upon the idea of a 
proposition."   Now, Simons is just plain wrong about Wittgenstein being in Norway when 
this happened; as noted on page ix of my book, and per the oft-quoted excerpt from von 
Wright's widely available memoir:    
 
"There is a story of how the idea of language as a picture of reality occurred to 
Wittgenstein.  [There exist several somewhat different versions of it.]  It was in the 
autumn of 1914, on the eastern front.  Wittgenstein was reading in a magazine 
about a lawsuit concerning an automobile accident. " 2 
 
Every scholarly biographical work I know of places the event after Wittgenstein entered 
the military, in the Fall of 1914; I don't think there is any dispute about this.  Simons goes 
on to say, mistakenly, that in 1914  "Wittgenstein had long given up aviation in favour of 
logic and was geographically and culturally isolated in Norway (the outbreak of the war 
took him by surprise.)"   First, the issue is not whether he had given up aviation, as we 
are talking about physics here, and one of the premier physics journals at that; 
Wittgenstein later mentions the very physics journal (The Physical Review) that later 
published the full-length version of the paper Simons is referring to, in a letter to his 
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student W. H. Watson.3  Second, Simons is mistaken here, too, on the facts of 
Wittgenstein's whereabouts.  Actually, Wittgenstein was not isolated in Norway up until 
the war began: he spent July 1914 in Vienna, and did not enter military service until early 
August.  I state this in the book (e.g., p. 204), it is reflected in many biographies, and it is 
definitively established by a letter he wrote from Vienna on July 3rd, 1914.4   I might add 
that, as mentioned in my book, July 1914 was the month that the National Academy of 
the Sciences issued the brief communication "On Physically Similar Systems" by Edgar 
Buckingham, a sort of synopsis of the main theoretical points in his forthcoming paper of 
the same name.   
     There was one other break in Wittgenstein's seclusion in Norway, and I mention it in 
the book as well -- Christmas of 1913, which he spent in Vienna at the wishes of his 
mother.  Again, that he was in Vienna then is definitively indicated by a letter he wrote to 
Russell from Vienna dated Christmas 1913.5  And here I might add that it just so 
happens that December 1913 was when Heike Kammerlingh Onnes gave his Nobel 
acceptance lecture on the use of mechanical similarity in conjunction with the kinetic 
theory of gases.  I discuss the significance of Onnes' lecture, with its discussion of the 
theory of corresponding states, in Chapters 6 and 7 of the book. 
      Thus, Simons claims about how isolated Wittgenstein was in 1914 are mistaken.  
Now, about the significance of the year 1914, the year in which Wittgenstein said he had 
his insight.  The year 1914 was a decisive one in the history of similarity, in which the 
insights that Galileo and Newton had about how to generalize the notion of similarity 
from geometry to mechanics was finally made fully general, and given a formal basis.  
The year began with a landmark paper by Stanton and Pannell in 1914 synthesizing the 
theoretical work in physics and the experimental work done at Britain's National Physical 
Laboratory on "similarity of motions."  The formal basis for the method of physical 
similarity, especially dynamic similarity, was presented mid-year by Edgar Buckingham, 
a philosophically minded physicist drafted to serve on the US Advisory Committee on 
Aeronautics, but he laid no claim to developing it, only to articulating it clearly and laying 
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out its foundations. He did so because the state of flight research at the time lacked such 
a reference articulating the theoretical foundations of the method in use.  As I explain in 
my book, there was a gradual progression from specific notions of similarity to more 
general accounts of similar motions in hydrodynamics, to the more mathematical, and 
finally, logical accounts of it in the early twentieth century.   Galileo had referred to 
geometry when he spoke of the book of nature being written in the language of 
mathematics;  Buckingham's more general account of similarity and invariants gives this 
place to any symbolic system having certain features and expressive capabilities, and 
formalizes similarity in such a way that the important consequences about similarity 
follow from a principle of logic.  Of course his account of the foundations bore some 
marks of his own academic training in Europe under Ostwald, and reflected his 
philosophical inclinations.       
     However, I do not, as Simons implies I do, point to a single person and a single 
theorem in isolation from the intellectual currents of the time.  What I give is an account 
of some currents in the intellectual and scientific milieu, one of which is the attention 
directed to the urgent problem of the credibility of the use of experimental models 
(people knew how to build and use experimental models; what they lacked was a 
account of the validity of what they were doing that would satisfy physicists and 
mathematicians.)  The ideas about physical similarity found in those currents in 1914 are 
the culmination of centuries of work on similarity from Galileo onwards, including 
Newton, Helmholtz, Fourier, Froude, Reynolds, and Rayleigh, to mention only a few.  I 
discuss a great number of discussions about this problem at the time by others (e.g., 
Stanton and Pannell's work, Gibson's text, James Thompson's anthology of papers on 
similarity published in 1913).  I discuss other work related to similarity, too, besides the 
efforts to justify inferences from experimental models in wind tunnels.   
    That these ideas were circulating in those currents around 1914 is reflected in D'Arcy 
Thompson's work, which later led to his On Growth and Form, a book containing one full 
chapter devoted to dimensional analysis.  Much of the literature he cites about scale in 
biology in that chapter is work that was done in the service of solving problems about 
flight.  Among the many other things I discuss is the explicit mention in physics venues  
of Galileo's Two New Sciences.  The work is known for its discussion of the problem of 
how one can make inferences about a large machine from the behavior of a small 
machine.  There was a publishing project underway then to remedy the fact that no 
translation of it was then readily available.  I discuss Heike Kammerlingh Onnes' 
crediting of Isaac Newton for the inspiration to apply  mechanical similarity to the 
molecular motion of gases.  I presented these as part of the milieu in which Wittgenstein 
was thinking about logic, but it turned out a more concrete connection existed, too:  it 
has recently been discovered that some of the books in Russell's library originally 
belonged to Wittgenstein. (Hide 2004) One of these was a copy of Galileo's Two New 
Sciences purchased before the new translation was available:  at the time Wittgenstein 
purchased it, it was rare and very expensive and a somewhat unusual purchase; he 
owned no other works by Galileo.   Another of the books belonging to Wittgenstein was 
the very work of Newton's in which he discusses his use of mechanical similarity.  I 
discuss the significance of the finding of both these books in my book (p. 130 - 134), so I 
think it unfair of Simons to begin his review with the statement:  "This book is about a 
coincidence", then mention only a single proof by Buckingham.   
     Simons also misleads by implying that I mention the paper by Buckingham mainly for 
a proof it contains.  He misstates the significance of the paper by implying that it is just 
about a proof, then misstates the gist of the proof as one about reducing the number of 
variables in an equation of the sort used in physics.  Buckingham's 1914 papers on 
physically similar systems are about how to establish that two physical systems are 
physically similar, which doesn't depend upon that proof.  There are two kinds of 
equations under discussion:  (i) physical equations, such as occur in science, and (ii) 
dimensional equations, which are of a different sort logically speaking.  There are 
likewise two distinct points that Simons runs together:  one is that a physical equation 
(the kind of equation used in physics) can be rewritten as an undetermined function of 
dimensionless parameters. The significance of this is that the system behavior is 
determined by a (nonunique) set of dimensionless parameters, even if the experimenter 
cannot predict or describe the system's behavior in terms of them.  The other point is 
that the dimensional equations can be used to determine the minimum number of 
dimensionless parameters needed to characterize the behavior of a system, even in the 
absence of knowledge of the specific governing equation.  The theorem is about 
determining that minimal number.  
      Simons takes the advance in Buckingham's "On Physically Similar Systems:  
Illustrations of the Use of Dimensional Equations" to be just about the theorem.  Perhaps 
it is no wonder, then, that Simons doesn't think there is much of logical significance here.  
It seems to me that Simons, who does not mention the difference between physical 
equations, dimensional equations, and undetermined relations between dimensionless 
parameters, misses something important in not even mentioning the emphasis I put on 
the role of dimensionless parameters, too -- these are not by any means special to 
Buckingham's paper, but run throughout works in the history of similarity.  It is equality of 
dimensionless parameters that establishes similarity of physical systems.  This is a very 
central point about similarity.  Here I see an analogy with the role of facts on the account 
in the Tractatus.  To avoid reproducing the bulk of the last chapters of the book here, I 
simply refer the reader to the book.    
     To Simons' complaint that the analogy I draw looks only superficial so far as he can 
tell, I can only say that one can lead a person to a pattern, but cannot make him or her 
see what one sees in it.  I would also emphasize that although I cite a specific paper, the 
concepts and framework I cite are not one person's view:  what I cite is the method of 
physical similarity, the notion of physically similar systems.  The framework I cite in 
drawing the analogy is as basic to the method of physical similarity as the basics of 
differentiation and integration are to calculus or the methods of algebra are to algebra.  
That Simons centers his review on the question of a causal path from Buckingham to 
Wittgenstein indicates that I may not have made this as clear as I should have.  So the 
claim I am making in drawing the analogy is mainly that the view in the Tractatus mirrors 
the methodology of physical similarity, which is the methodology implemented in using 
scale models.  I can only suggest studying the analogy I have laid out, while well aware 
of the tedium this involves until the analogy is grasped.    
     Here it seems to me that the aforementioned failure to distinguish between physical 
equations and dimensional equations is an obstacle for Simons.  He writes:  "the kind of 
independence that Wittgenstein envisaged holding between propositions was wholly 
different from the independence of variables in a physical equation.  One is logical, the 
other functional, independence."   Actually, on page 239 of the book I point out that 
independence of dimensionless parameters is established as a matter of logic.  This is in 
part why Buckingham said that so much that had earlier been thought to be an empirical 
matter actually followed from a principle of logic.  I wouldn't blame Simons for an initial 
disbelief of my claims here;  that would only be natural to anyone who understands 
something of the significance of what  I claim in drawing the analogy.  The first reaction 
of anyone who really understands what is being claimed or revealed by Buckingham's 
formulation is disbelief that certain things could possibly be a matter of logic alone.  As 
someone has put it, at first dimensional analysis seems like magic.   In more recent 
work, I have delved more deeply into where this information comes from; it has to do 
with the empirical content already built into the relationship between systems of units 
suitable for use in a physical science and systems of scientific laws. (Sterrett 2006, 
Sterrett 2009)   As for Simons' complaint that Wittgenstein's recursive application of a 
general truth-functional operator is very different from equations involving  "products of 
powers of quantities", as he puts it, Simons neglects to mention what I do say about 
operations:  that dimensions on Buckingham's account are regarded as the results of 
operations and that the exponent indicates that the operation has been recursively 
applied. (p. 191 - 192)  In fact, I point out that what numbers turn out to be are exponents 
of operations, on both the exposition Buckingham gives of dimensional equations, and 
on the account Wittgenstein gives in the Tractatus.   Here again I refer the reader to my 
book (p. 192) , to avoid reproducing lengthy portions of it here.   I thank Simons for 
paying so much attention to the details of the analogy presented in the book, though.  
These are crucial points to look at.  I expect that a better understanding of the logic of 
dimensions and dimensional equations might clear up the points at issue and, hopefully, 
reward such headache-inducing efforts.     
     I have two other criticisms of Simons' review that are matters of omission.  The first Is 
that he neglects to mention that all of Wittgenstein's journals, notes, and papers prior to 
1914 were destroyed (at his request).  Thus, as I mention in the book at several places, 
one cannot take lack of evidence of this sort as evidence of lack of any particular interest 
on Wittgenstein's part.  As for actual documents from this period of Wittgenstein's life, 
there is little more than the letters he wrote that others have kept.  I did not think that I 
did anything to raise expectations that I would establish a specific causal connection, as 
Simons implies I do --- just the opposite:  from the beginning, on pg. xx in the Preface, I 
clearly state that any direct evidence in the form of his journals, notes, or papers he read 
was unavailable.  (The books previously owned by Wittgenstein that were recently found 
in Russell's library are from that period and, as mentioned above, bear out my 
suggestion of an interest in physical similarity.)  Although I did describe an initial 
motivation of investigating a connection between Buckingham's paper and Wittgenstein, 
I thought that I made it clear that I soon realized that there was no other choice than to 
proceed as I have done, by triangulation from other currents in his milieu and from what 
he wrote that was not destroyed (e.g., p. xx,  p. 205).   
     My other complaint about omissions in Simons' review is that he neglects to mention 
the new critical-historical contributions in the book about Wittgenstein's childhood that I 
dug up:  the discussion of phonautographs (sound records never meant to be played 
back, but only to be viewed) that were standard fare in children's science textbooks of 
the era, and the prominent role that the problem of scaling played in one of the most 
popular boys' novels of the time:  H. G. Wells' Robur the Conqueror.  The first is 
discussed at length in the first chapter and is the subject of a self-standing philosophical 
paper (Sterrett 2005a) in which I draw attention to his emphasis on gramophone discs, 
which are meant to be played back, over the phonautograph type of representation in the 
passage about gramophones in the Tractatus.  The problems of flight explicitly 
discussed in the H. G. Wells' youth novel connect directly with a popular lecture on 
aeronautics that Boltzmann gave in Vienna practically around the corner from 
Wittgenstein's home when he was six years old.   Why Simons does not even mention 
the elements in the childhood milieu that I include among the threads in the background 
of the moment of insight in 1914, but brings up jet engines (which are from a later era 
and are not mentioned in my book) is a little puzzling.  The threads from the milieu in 
Wittgenstein's very early life that I lay out in the beginning of the book are picked up near 
the end of the book and woven into the account I give.  
     Simons uses the metaphor of kite-flying to have a little fun at my expense in the 
closing of his review.  Replying with a like metaphor, I might say:  History indicates one 
ought not be too hasty in saying whether something can fly or not -- especially on the 
basis of pure thought.  I appreciate that Simons has at least tried to grasp the analogy 
the book presents, and have some sympathy with his frustration. It is not a simple 
analogy.  Yet I hope that at least the general gist of the analogy can be comprehended 
without too much trouble.  I wrote the book so that it might provide something of interest 
for anyone who reads it, not least of all philosophers of science.   
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